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Abstract
Erickson and Thompson articulate and defend reasonableness as an important civic educational aim
for early childhood education. In this response, I argue that further clarity regarding the nature and
scope of “reasonableness” as an educational concept is needed. Is such a concept fundamentally political, or does it capture a broader notion of educational value? My view is that, from an educational
point of view, the need for reasonable deliberation in plural societies makes salient that there are certain situations that mature moral agents should be prepared to handle (i.e., conflict about basic political matters). But this is merely part of a broader moral education. I explain why I think this is the case,
pointing to some sharp differences between the nature of civic deliberation and moral deliberation,
more broadly.
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Overview

n “Preschool as a Wellspring of Democracy: Endorsing
Traits of Reasonableness in Early Childhood Education,”
Erickson and Thompson (2019) articulate and defend a
conception of reasonableness as an educational aim for early
childhood. They claim that in a liberal democratic society, citizens
must “sufficiently exhibit traits of reasonableness in their engagement with their fellows” (p. 1). These traits of reasonableness
“encompass adaptive habits, skills, mind-sets, values, norms, and
attitudes that guide one’s engagement with other persons as moral
and political equals in a process of shared political life” (p. 2).
Reasonableness is used here in the Rawlsian sense, that is, citizens
motivated, and able, to accept/propose terms of social cooperation
for the benefit of all (Rawls, 2005). The reasonable citizen, for
example, is someone who recognizes that their own idea of what is
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good or worthwhile will be different from that of other citizens.
Accordingly, reasonable citizens understand that some of the
public policies that they see as obviously beneficial will be unacceptable to others. The reasonable citizen accepts this and sees
value in political solutions that all similarly reasonable citizens can
freely accept without intimidation, coercion, or indoctrination.
Being reasonable is normative. It does not develop naturally or
in the home (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, p. 2). Without
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educational intervention, we are apt to be bad at being reasonable.
Unreasonable citizens polarize the political culture of society,
making it more fragmented and less cooperative. Erickson and
Thompson (2019) attribute recent legislative failures in the US to
polarization effects made possible by a deficit in reasonableness
traits in the public sphere (p. 2). Therefore, the cultivation of
reasonableness is a public good and a legitimate1 civic educational
aim. As the authors note, political philosophers have long argued
the implications of reasonableness for civic education (Brighouse,
1998; Callan, 1997; De Wijze, 1999). Typically, these arguments
have focused on civic education in schools. The authors’ novel
contribution is to argue that reasonableness as a civic education
goal should be extended to preschool, offering two reasons why
preschool represents a special opportunity for its cultivation.
The first reason is institutional. Preschool is a significant
public space for children taking their first, tentative steps away
from the private sphere of the family (Erickson & Thompson, 2019,
p. 4). Accordingly, encounters with other children are a powerful
opportunity to structure a good ‘civic first impression’ in a way that
makes civic norms of reasonableness explicit. Think, for example,
of the teacher’s insistence that young children share classroom
toys. As the authors put it, “[p]reschool civics standards guiding
classroom dealings . . . do not convey the depth with which we
believe young children should come to understand rules, such as
the directive to share, to be justified by an appeal to the common
good” (Erickson & Thompson, 2019, p. 4). That is to say, educators
can engage preschool children in pluralistic dialogue—likely
among their first experiences of public deliberation—in order to
cultivate the reciprocity deemed essential for civic reasonableness.
The second reason is developmental. According to the
authors, empirical research suggests that children are naturally
more open-minded than older children and adults. Their schemas
are less shaped (or biased) by previous experience, and so they are
more open to social cooperation. This will “increase the likelihood
young children will willingly participate in civic-minded explorations and come to value examining their own views in conjunction
with others, which in turn, could serve them in their future
political interactions with others” (Erickson & Thompson, 2019,
p. 5). Young children are impressionable, and educators should
take advantage of this fact in order to prime them to view social
cooperation favorably.

1 In the sense that the liberal state has the political authority to promote reasonableness in public institutions such as schools. Erickson and
Thompson (2019) address the problem of political neutrality in order to
address the objection that an education for reasonableness in preschool
is too politically controversial. I cannot address their argument in full
here but can point out that while reasonableness may not be politically
controversial it does not follow that preschooling ought to be a state
responsibility. The argument that preschools ought to provide civic education requires an account of why the preschool is part of the basic structure of a liberal society and therefore subject to the political authority of
the state. Without such authority, which would cover the education of all
young children, we risk a system in which some preschool children have
the privilege of an education for civic reasonableness and others do not.
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Reasonableness and Early Childhood
Should reasonableness be an aim of education in early childhood?
The promise, as I understand it, is that if reasonableness were an
expectation from the earliest stages of moral development, citizens
would internalize traits of reasonableness durable enough to resist
an increasingly divisive public culture.2 Erickson and Thompson
(2019) put forward an appealing case for thinking that reasonableness as an aim of education in early childhood may increase
political stability in the long term. They supplement their case with
thoughtful pedagogical examples that would be endorsed by most
any educator committed to the promotion of rationality as an
educational aim. The preschool is a neglected area of focus for
normative thinking about education, and the authors do a service
in directing scholarly attention to important questions regarding
the moral and political responsibilities of early childhood
education.
The focus of my response will be on the Rawlsian framework
that Erickson and Thompson (2019) draw on in order to justify
pluralistic dialogue in the preschool classroom. While the authors
make a convincing case that the aims of preschooling need to be
more carefully theorized, I believe that more needs to be said about
what makes these aims specifically Rawlsian. The educational value
of many of the practices that the authors endorse, especially those
centered on pluralistic dialogue, could just as easily (or perhaps
even more easily) be captured by other deliberative democratic
theories (Gutmann, 1999; Habermas, 1990). This does not mean
that the authors should appeal to these other theories. My point
is that an account detailing what a specifically Rawlsian account
reveals about the educational value of preschool deliberation, in
contrast to other deliberative theories, would provide a stronger
theoretical and practice rationale to Erickson’s and Thompson’s
proposed project.
In this spirit, I make two key points. The first point attempts to
clarify how the educational aim of Rawlsian reasonableness is
distinctive within a broader picture of preschool moral and civic
education. My claim here is that, from an educational point of view,
the need for reasonable deliberation in plural societies makes
salient certain situations that mature moral agents should be
prepared to handle (i.e., conflict about basic political matters).
Preschools have a potentially important role to play in such
preparation, but this role should be framed within a broader moral
education. I will do this by pointing to some sharp differences
between the nature of civic deliberation and moral deliberation.
My efforts at clarification do not aim to change, substantively,
anything that Erickson and Thompson (2019) advance in their
paper so much as sharpen the distinctive value that a Rawlsian
deliberation brings early childhood education.
My second point focuses on potential challenges facing the
preschool educator aiming to promote Rawlsian traits of reasonableness. Recall that Rawlsian reasonableness is valuable insofar as
it enables citizens to resolve their disagreements through a
“freestanding” justification. By this I mean that citizens do not
2 I leave to the side the question of whether this comes close to civic
indoctrination, but see Brighouse (1998).
article response

2

resolve public moral and political disagreements through appeal to
what they believe is “true” or “right”; rather, they propose fair terms
that they anticipate other citizens can accept from the standpoint
of their own particular conception of the good. This approach to
political deliberation is sometimes referred to as “epistemic
abstinence” (Raz, 1990). The authors do not explicitly propose
that children should be taught to endorse epistemic abstinence
i.e. that they stop thinking that the claims they make in a pluralistic
dialogue are potentially “true” or “right.” But given that Erickson
and Thompson claim that their approach is Rawlsian, and given
also that the point of Rawlsian reasonableness traits is to prepare
future citizens to deal with basic moral and political disagreements
in an epistemically abstentious way, this raises some challenges for
how the preschool educator should handle the moral or political
disagreements that are bound to arise in the preschool classroom.

Is Preschool Reasonableness Moral or Civic?
Erickson and Thompson (2019) frame reasonableness as an
important civic educational goal. They point to gridlock in the
legislative process as a consequence of an unreasonable political
culture. Their conjecture is that an emphasis on reasonableness
early in life will pay dividends for political stability in the long run.
It is plausible to imagine that if young children internalize traits of
reasonableness early in life we will get a better political culture in
return. However, should we think that these political goods reflect
the reason why early childhood educators should promote traits
such as perspective-taking and a desire for the common good? It
seems both more intuitive and more justifiable to view the traits
preschools ought to instill as part of a broader moral education; one
that understands political morality as but one part of the reasonable, appropriately conceived. While I do not think that the authors
explicitly reject this latter view, and could even accept such a view
without serious change to their proposal, I believe an account of the
place of Rawlsian traits of reasonableness within a broader picture
of moral and civic education could help preschool teachers better
understand why they should support the promotion of the former.
On the one hand, Erickson and Thompson (2019) claim that
their concept of reasonableness is intended to be broad, with the
idea that additional traits of reasonableness could be identified and
accounted for in further work (p. 2). On the other hand, their
justification of the reasonable is “in alignment with Rawls” (p. 2).
People should be reasonable for the reason that they have different
worldviews, and arriving at an overlapping consensus/common
good among these different worldviews increases political
stability.3 Consequently, by them aligning with Rawls, I think that
3 In various places in the text, Erickson and Thompson (2019) argue
that reasonable political deliberation should lead to the “common good.”
Rawls (2005) explicitly states that reasonable deliberators are not moved
by an interest in the “general good” but in fair terms of social cooperation (p. 50). These fair terms amount to an overlapping consensus in
which a pluralistic community can endorse the same principles but for
different reasons. Because the authors are in alignment with Rawls, I take
them to see “common good” as equivalent to an “overlapping consensus”
as opposed to a utilitarian “greater good.”
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their conception of the reasonable comes across as narrower than
intended. This, because Rawlsian reasonableness refers to the
political domain specifically, as opposed to a moral sensibility,
which can be applied to a number of different domains: political,
public, private, civic, and so on.
Therefore, the authors could make their case more persuasive
by being explicit in identifying the distinctive value that a Rawlsian
framework brings to preschool deliberations apart from other
educational theories that emphasize the inclusion of a plurality of
views in public discussion. Without such clarification, the wouldbe educator sympathetic to reasonableness is at risk of going awry.
Consider the example of children not wanting to share a toy
(Erickson and Thompson, 2019, p. 4). We could reframe this
conflict as a political problem in order to promote Rawlsian
political morality. The “political community” of the classroom has
a valuable, but scarce, resource (toys). Children are in a conflict
over who gets to play with that toy and for how long (a distributive
justice problem). The early childhood educator sees this conflict as
an opportunity to get children to deliberate about the effects and
consequences of, say, different distributive approaches. Along the
way, children exercise competences related to social cooperation.
Some of them make important cognitive achievements, such as
realizing that if everyone insisted on what they wanted all the time,
everyone would be worse off. Eventually, the class arrives at fair
terms that all can accept: a distributive rule that ensures every child
has an equal opportunity to play with the toy.
If successful, the teachers will have arguably had a positive
effect on children “as future political actors” (Erickson & Thompson, 2005, p. 5) in a liberal pluralist democracy. Yet does the
educational value of these and other laudatory interventions
depend on the existence of such a political framework? I suspect
that educators on board with the authors’ proposed interventions
ought not to see them (exclusively) as Rawlsian, or even political,
aims. First, the cases the authors use in their examples (toys,
hatching chicks) may resemble political problems in the abstract,
but for the people caught up in them (children, teachers), they are
first and foremost moral problems. By “moral,” I mean interpersonal conflicts pertaining to how individual actors treat one
another. In our daily interactions—in the workplace and in the
home—a moral point of view calls on us to treat each other with
respect and dignity. The fact that I want something, for example,
doesn’t make it morally permissible to harm others in order to get
it. It is morally impermissible to harm others on such grounds,
even where there are no laws against it or no political authority to
prevent me from doing so. When educators are working with
young children, they ought to instill these norms of treatment in
children irrespective of the political goods that such efforts might
(or might not) generate in the long run. Or, to put it differently,
political morality is not the only good served by instilling norms.
For example, part of what it means for the early childhood educator to treat children with moral respect is to make sure that
appropriate norms of moral respect are recognized and followed
by all.
Second, I suspect that on Rawls’s (2005) own account,
Rawlsian reasonableness is too narrow as a standalone educational
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concept for early childhood. Rawls claims that the reasonable is
that part of a moral conception of the person concerned with
social cooperation (p. 51). Rawls emphasizes its importance for a
political conception of the person. The reasonable is connected to
a sense of political justice but it is not exhausted by a sense of
political justice. Citizens also live as individuals and in associations
that are not strictly political. They must be reasonable as is appropriate in those apolitical contexts, and more besides. To be sure,
when the Rawlsian citizen enters into deliberations about basic
public and political arrangement, they need to be reasonable in the
narrow sense if we want to successfully “specify the reasons we are
to share and publicly recognize before one another as grounding
our social relations” (p. 53). But this is simply the public-facing side
of a larger moral sensibility that enables us to see other people as
distinctive centers of value in their own right. This moral sensibility, which includes reasonableness, is logically prior to a political
conception of the person. Therefore, if all of morality is normative
(in the sense that we can learn to do it better), and if we ought to
educate for political morality, it follows that we have reason to
educate for morality full stop.
This is all to say that what we take “reasonableness” to mean in
the educational domain will make a practical difference for the
early childhood educator. I argue that we should want preschool
educators to understand reasonableness in the broader sense. In
the political sphere, we call on reasonableness in order to propose
cooperative principles and policies governing basic matters of
justice and fairness. However, while this aspect of civic life is
important, it makes for a relatively small dimension of our moral
experience. Reasonableness, for example, also applies to public
morality—to those person-to-person situations when we are called
on to treat others (and ourselves) with moral respect despite
disagreement or conflict. Accordingly, the reasons that educators
have (and the reasons they should give to their students) for
promoting reasonableness traits are not limited to the idea that, by
acquiring such traits, children will be better citizens—better public
reasoners—in the future. Rather, children should acquire an
understanding of what it means to treat other persons as persons.4
Reasonableness understood as a broad moral power that
informs political morality expands the range of situations that the
early childhood educator can recognize as opportunities for
fostering traits of reasonableness. It also expands what counts as a
reasonableness trait. Consider the child who makes a lying promise
to another student in order to get the toy (“I will give it back in just
a minute”). Lying does not appear to fall under the kind of situations that the authors have in mind. There is no encounter with
“rational views dissimilar from one’s own” (Erickson & Thompson,
2019, p. 2) nor a plurality of interests that require accommodation.
Nor is there a burden of judgement in play: any reasonable person
would think the lie was wrong. Nonetheless, many of the educational interventions that the authors recommend in their paper
4 Note that another positive feature of the broader approach is that the
justification of structured deliberation does not depend on the empirical
claim that it will make young children reasonable citizens in the
long run.
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would be welcome in this case. The educator would be well advised
to do more than simply direct the child not to lie or manipulate
others. They could take the conflict as an opportunity to encourage
the class to deliberate on the reasons why it is wrong to lie and if
there are ever circumstances where lying is appropriate, and so on.
They could encourage children to share what it feels like to be lied
to. Reason-giving, moral sensitivity, and perspective-taking: all are
candidate traits of reasonableness under this broader conception.
They may not translate fully into the context of political morality,
but they more fully capture what it means to educate for reasonable
persons.
Am I arguing that we should just drop Rawlsian reasonableness and focus on the moral? On the contrary, setting out this
broader context prepares the way for a distinctive argument for
why Rawlsian traits of reasonableness matter. I suspect that there
are several candidate reasons. But here is one: Learning how to
show respect for persons when it comes to noncontroversial
matters such as sharing a favorite toy can be motivationally
challenging for children. Epistemically speaking, it’s not too hard
to recognize what the right thing to do involves. Children often
know that they ought to share, they just don’t want to. Learning
how to show respect for other persons in a diverse society, however,
is a more complex matter. Part of what it means to be a moral agent
in a diverse society is to realize that other moral agents should be
free to disagree with us on things we care deeply about. This means
that, especially in pluralistic situations where there may be little
common ground, we should strive to keep cooperating. One way to
do this is to promote an early awareness of just how diverse in its
moral perspectives a flourishing democratic society can be. Not
every moral conflict in the classroom needs to be framed in this
way, but there will surely be some that fit the bill. An awareness of
moral diversity (or “the fact of pluralism/fact of disagreement”)
and other Rawlsian reasonableness traits like it are potentially key
to the overall moral preparation of person’s living in a democratic
community.

Reasonableness and Epistemic Abstinence
I claimed that one reason why reasonableness is a distinctively
valuable educational aim is because engaging in respectful debate
with other citizens in a plural society can be epistemically challenging. One way to get around the challenge recommended by a
Rawlsian approach—to deflate the deliberative tensions, as it
were—is to stop thinking about deliberation as a search for the
“right” or “true” answer in the first place.
This is where political reasonableness really comes in.
The reasonable citizen values, for its own sake, a society in which
all can benefit. Nonetheless, there is an important difference
between a reasonable political agent and a reasonable moral one.
The reasonable political agent will propose that we allocate
playtime in accordance with principle X because they anticipate
that others (themselves included) will be able to endorse that
allocation even if everyone’s reasons for agreeing to that
principle are different (for example, some agents want equal time
because they were taught at home that equality matters, while some
agents want equal time because they know that if they can’t get to
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an agreement otherwise, they are likely to get no playtime, while
others simply value equality for its own sake). This is what makes
political principles “freestanding” for Rawls. Political justification
aims to be “reasonable,” not “right” or “correct.” This is sometimes
called an “epistemic abstinence” account of public deliberation
(Raz, 1990). The reasonable moral agent will propose that we
allocate playtime in accordance with principle X because they
believe that they can justify that allocation to all others in terms of
shared reasons that all could recognize and accept. Maybe they are
mistaken in their belief. Regardless, they are committed to finding
an action/policy/principle that can be justified to everyone. That is
to say, they believe that their moral judgement has validity and that
through reasoned discourse with others, they can redeem that
validity.
While the difference is philosophically subtle, the moral
psychology involved is quite different. In the political mode, I
check what I believe to be true or right, and I instead propose/
endorse principles that I anticipate others (myself included) will
also endorse. While I may think these principles are false, I view
them as reasonable because they can win the support of others
based on their own private reasons, my own included (Rawls, 2005,
p. 143). In the moral mode, meanwhile, I believe the principle to be
justifiable, and I’m willing to test out that belief, submitting it to
critical scrutiny by diverse others.
To be sure, children should be prepared to occasionally
bracket what they believe to be true, good, or right in plural
contexts. This is desirable both as a political and a personal trait.
But I think that it would be a mistake to leave children with the
impression that all political conflicts can or should be solved via
social cooperation. As moral agents, we have an intuitive sense that
our actions should be justifiable to an audience of our peers—that
we act on reasons that all others in a relevantly similar situation
could accept, or at the least not reasonably reject (Habermas, 1990;
Scanlon, 1998). Learning about the justifiability of our actions
requires opportunities for epistemic deliberation with others—a
search for truth or rightness. The epistemically abstentious
political morality that the early childhood educator is being asked
to aim for is based on an institutional separation between a citizen’s
personally held views on the good life and the public sphere
(Habermas, 2006). It is an institutional separation that mature
moral agents need to be aware of when they engage in public
reason in spaces such as the courts. But we ought to be careful not
to institutionalize the developing child’s moral conscience. The
question that needs to be carefully considered is how appropriate it
is, developmentally speaking, to teach young children to view
epistemic abstinence as a basic feature of their moral reasoning.5
5 “The liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological
burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith. It must of course
expect of them that they recognize the principle that political authority is
exercised with neutrality towards competing world views. Every citizen
must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond the institutional threshold that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations” (Habermas, 2006, p. 11).
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One might argue that the early childhood educator is in no
danger of doing anything like this. We are simply asking that they
encourage children to appreciate how people from different
backgrounds and experiences will view political issues such as
immigration and gender representation differently. But if the
educator is supposed to be aiming for genuinely Rawlsian traits
of reasonableness it is not enough that children be exposed to, and
learn to appreciate, different points of view. There is a plethora of
deliberative theories that would endorse the same practices.
Success in preparing children for life as reasonable Rawlsian
citizens means future citizens who practice epistemic abstinence.
One could again stress that all we are asking the preschool
educator to do is foster traits of reasonableness in a very basic
sense. It does not require them to get into thorny questions about
the epistemic nature and limits of public justification. As the
authors are careful to point out, after all, their examples “showcase
an awareness of moral complexity and epistemic humility (forwarded as potential, but not here defended as necessary, traits of
reasonableness) in developmentally appropriate ways” (Erickson &
Thompson, 2019, p. 8, emphasis mine). However, given that the
preschool educator will be engaging with children on political
issues, they are likely to encounter situations where children are
sincerely giving the best epistemic reasons they have for their
moral and political beliefs. These reasons may be received as plain
wrong by other students (perhaps such reasons come across as
offensive or controversial). It isn’t clear to me what the preschool
educator aiming for Rawlsian reasonableness should do in such
situations. Encouraging the classroom to critically assess controversial reasons as a deliberative community seems to be too
epistemic a way of framing deliberation to pay the political
dividends the authors want. But encouraging children to bracket
the concept of truth or rightness and aim for social cooperation
seems to introduce the very institutionalization of moral consciousness that I’m concerned about. My view is that the epistemic
route is the right way to go (Martin, 2018). But if not, a specifically
Rawlsian conception of reasonableness requires saying more about
the extent to which, and the ways in which, epistemic abstinence is
developmentally appropriate (or not) in the preschool classroom.

Conclusion
I want to underscore that my points are aimed at further clarity and
elaboration, motivated by a promising project. Erickson’s &
Thompson’s paper is to be lauded for the moral seriousness it
accords to both young children and the professionals responsible
for their care. My modest suggestion is that a more detailed
account of reasonableness as an educational concept will make this
proposal both more convincing to, and more helpful as a guide for,
the early childhood educator.
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